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JONES-HAMILTON CO. v. BEAZER MATERIALS & SERVICES,
INC.: THE BOTTOMLESS PIT OF CERCLA
GENERATOR LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc.,I the
Ninth Circuit imposed "generator" liability on a chemical provider in an action for contribution for cleanup costs by a chemical
formulator.2 Toxic waste was released into containment ponds
during the formulation process, in which the formulator utilized
the provider's raw materials. 3 The materials were furnished
under a contract in which the provider retained ownership of the
original materials and which specified a tolerance for a small percent of spillage by the formulator. 4 The Beazer court held that the
provider qualified as having "arranged for disposal" under section 107(a)(3) 5 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
6
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
CERCLA provides a remedial measure 7 to permit the recovery of costs for the removal of hazardous wastes.8 The Act was
enacted in order to counteract the rapid increase of hazardous
waste sites 9 and the damaging effects to the environment caused
1. 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 131. For a further discussion of the facts and holding of Beazer, see
infra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
3. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 130-31.
6. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). See generally
Frank P. Grad, A LegislativeHistory of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
7. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). CERCLA defines the terms
"remedy" or "remedial action" to mean:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or
welfare or the environment.
Id.
8. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "hazardous waste," "hazardous
substance," "toxic waste," and "toxic material" are used synonymously.
9. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20). CERCLA was enacted to provide both
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by the release of hazardous substances.' 0 CERCLA authorizes
the creation of a resource of funds, known as "Superfund,"" to
enable the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up
2
hazardous waste sites as the toxic conditions are discovered.'
Despite the availability of Superfund resources to enable EPA
to quickly commence cleanup of a contaminated site, CERCLA
places the ultimate responsibility for cleanup costs on "those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons."' 3 Thus, CERCLA authorizes a federal cause of action to
recover costs expended under Superfund. 14 CERCLA empowers
EPA to bring suit against four classes of persons' 5 for response
costs 16 and compensation for damages caused by the release of
hazardous wastes.' 7 CERCLA allows cleanup costs to be imposed
"rapid responses to the nationwide threats posed by 30-50,000 improperly managed hazardous waste sites in this country as well as to induce voluntary responses to those sites." Id. at 805.
10. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th
Cir. 1989) (CERCLA was "enacted... in an effort to eliminate unsafe hazardous
waste sites.").
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). The legislation establishes a $1.6 billion
dollar trust fund (Superfund) from industry and federal appropriations, to finance cleanup and containment of hazardous waste sites. The state or federal
government may then seek compensation from responsible parties to reimburse
the Superfund money expended in the cleanup. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 80506 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20).
12. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1377. See CERCLA §§ 104-105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 96049605.
13. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoted by Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1377).
14. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1377 ("CERCLA authorizes the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites itself and creates a 'Superfund' with which to fund the EPA's
activities.") See 26 U.S.C. § 9507; CERCLA §§ 104-105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 96049605. For an explanation of Superfund, see supra note 11.
15. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). "Person" is defined as an
"individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id.
16. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). CERCLA defines the terms
"respond" or "response" to mean "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include
enforcement activities related thereto." Id.
17. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section imposes liability
and states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section 1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
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on owners or operators, transporters, and "generators"' 8 of hazardous waste.' 9 However, a "generator" of toxic waste is not
limited to those who actually discharge the contaminants into the
environment. 20 For purposes of imposing CERCLA liability, the
criteria for imposing "generator" liability are considered by many
to be more complicated than those imposing liability on other potentially responsible persons (PRPs). 2 1 Section 107(a)(3) itself is
laden with terms which are unclear or simply undefined, and the
legislative intent is nearly impossible to determine. 22 CERCLA's
nebulous legislative history has frequently left courts to "fill in
the gaps," and has resulted in generator liability being imposed
23
in an increasingly wide range of circumstances.
This Note will examine the legislative history of section
107(a)(3), and trace the judicial development of generator liability. This Note will then analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision in
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
18. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "generator" and "arranger"
are used interchangeably.
19. For the statutory section imposing liability on potentially responsible
persons (PRPs), see CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See supra notes 15,
17, and accompanying text.
20. Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfeild, CERCLA Liabilityfor Hazardous
Waste "Generators": How Far Does Liability Extend?, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH.J. 33
(1990).
21. Id. at 34.
22. For a discussion of legislative intent, see infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
23. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20, at 34-36.
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Beazer, 24 with an emphasis on its implications for determining the
current standards and the potential upper limits of generator
liability.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GENERATOR LIABILITY

Legislative History of Section 107(a)(3)

CERCLA was enacted in 1980 in response to the alarming
increase in the number of hazardous waste sites and the damage
derived from the release 2 5 of contaminants into the environment.2 6 The purpose of the Act was twofold: first and foremost,
to ensure swift cleanup of toxic waste sites; 2 7 and second, to impose the costs of cleanup on the parties responsible for the release of the hazardous substances. 28 The statute was enacted by
24. 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 151-78 and accompanying
text for an analysis of the Beazer decision.
25. CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). "Release" is defined by
CERCLA as any "spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment" any pollutant or contaminant or hazardous substance. Id.
26. CERCLA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8). Environment is defined by
CERCLA as:
(A) the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the
ocean waters of which the natural resources are under the exclusive
management authority of the United States under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882
(1992)], and
(B) any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land
surface or other subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United
States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id. For a discussion of the impetus behind CERCLA's enactment, see supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
27. Cleanup of the contaminated sites is achieved by the removal of the
toxic materials. See CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). CERCLA defines the terms "remove" or "removal" as:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary(sic) taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release
of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release ....
Id.
28. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). "Hazardous substance" is
defined as any substance designated under § 1321 (b)(2)(A) of Title 33; any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to § 9602
of this title; any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under
§ 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6921), except any waste for
which Congress has suspended regulation; any toxic pollutant listed under
§ 1317(a) of Title 33; any hazardous air pollutant listed under § 112 of the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412); and any imminently hazardous chemical sub-
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Congress "as compromise legislation after very limited debate
under a suspension of the rules." 2 9 As a result of the rapid and
somewhat chaotic process 30 of enacting CERCLA, the Act "has
acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions
and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history." 3' The
ensuing years have seen numerous interpretations of the statutory language due to the indistinct nature of many of CERCLA's
32
provisions.
Section 107(a) of CERCLA is the vehicle for imposing liability on persons responsible for the release 3 3 of toxic wastes into
the environment.3 4 Response costs may be sought from persons
35
responsible for generating toxic waste into the environment.
The criteria as to who qualifies as a "generator" of toxic waste,
however, is both complex and indeterminate. 36 "Generator" or
stance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to § 2606 of Title 15. The term excludes petroleum, including crude oil
or any fraction thereof which is not specifically listed in one of the foregoing
provisions, natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel. See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14).
29. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (citing
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); see
also Grad, supra note 6.
The bill which actually became CERCLA had "virtually no legislative history
at all," despite Congress' work on toxic waste cleanup bill for over three years.
Grad, supra note 6, at 1. The bill was "hurriedly put together by a bipartisan
leadership group of senators," and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other
pending similar measures. Id. It was placed before the House and considered
"in the closing days of a lame duck session of an outgoing Congress." Id. As a
result, it was considered and passed after very limited debate and under a suspension of the rules which did not allow for amendments. Id.
30. The legislative history is difficult to follow, partially since "[tiwo different bills proceeded through the House and the Senate" and a combination of
the two eventually became what is known as CERCLA. United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982). The Senate
made some last minute amendments to its bill, S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980), notably in removing the language imposing liability for personal injury
caused by hazardous waste. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1111. The House struck
the language from its own bill, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), and then
substituted the language of the Senate into its bill, which was eventually enacted.
Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp at 1111. The bill retained the House file number. Id.
Accord United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO),
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
31. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902 (citing United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp.
1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
32. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20, at 34-36.
33. See supra note 25 for the definition of "release" under CERCLA; see also
CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
34. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
35. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
36. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). CER-
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"arranger" liability is imposed by section 107(a)(3) on persons
who arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances under a
contract or agreement, regardless of ownership or possession of
37
the hazardous substances.
The most problematic component of this provision, and that
which is most subject to interpretation by courts, is the phrase
'3 8
"by contract or agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal."
"Disposal" 3 9 is given the same meaning as that provided for in
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 40 and refers to any means by which
any solid or hazardous waste is permitted to enter the environment or is released into the air or waterways. 4 1 The term "arranged," which is at the crux of the issue of generator liability, is
not defined anywhere in the statute. 42 Similarly, the meaning of
the phrase "otherwise arranged" is unclear. As a result, courts
have been obliged to construe the meaning of the provision with
meager aid from the legislative history, by supplementing the history with principles of common law and other fields.
B.

Statutory Construction of CERCLA

The basic rule of statutory construction is to look first to the
language of the statute, and then to the legislative history if the
CLA itself "presents a relatively complex solution to a complex problem. It
leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a reflection of
the hasty compromises which were reached as the bill was pushed through Congress just before the close of its 96th Session." Id.
37. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). CERCLA specifically imposes generator liability on "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment .... of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances."
Id.
38. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20, at 34; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Interpreting Section 107(A)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person "Arrangedfor Disposal?",44
SMU L. REV. 1313 (1991).
39. See CERCLA § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) ("The terms 'disposal,'
'hazardous waste,' and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section
1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6903]."). See infra note 41
and accompanying text for a description of the meaning of "disposal."
40. CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
41. CERCLA § 103(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). The term "disposal" means:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so
that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
Id.
42. See Gaba, supra note 38; Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20; see also CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601; CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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language is unclear. 43 As the language of section 107(a)(3) is not
well defined, and the legislative history is unclear at best,4 4 courts
are left to interpret the provisions which lack clarity in order to
45
facilitate the goals of CERCLA.
It has generally been considered that the remedial nature of
CERCLA requires a liberal statutory construction in order to
avoid frustrating the essential purpose of the Act. 4 6 The essential
purpose 4 7 of CERCLA is to provide the federal government with
the necessary tools for prompt and effective response to the
threat posed by hazardous waste in the environment, and to impose accountability for remedial actions on the persons responsible for the threat. 48 Given this remedial intent, its provisions
"should be afforded a broad and liberal construction so as to
avoid frustration of prompt response efforts." 49 In addition, liberal construction avoids placing limitations on those responsible
for response costs "beyond the limits expressly provided." 50
It is evident that Congress intended the scope of liability
under CERCLA to "be determined from traditional and evolving
principles of common law." 5' The statute contemplates that Federal common law be developed and implemented in order to interpret CERCLA where the statutory language is incomplete or
indeterminative. 5 2 The enactment of CERCLA itself was spurred
43. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 901-02 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct.
1541, 1548 (1984); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
44. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). "Unfortunately, the legislative history [of CERCLA] is unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements." Id.
45. Gaba, supra note 38, at 1316.
46. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902.
47. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1331. Despite the lack of clarity in the legislative
history of CERCLA, "[wihat is clear, however, is that the Act is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump sites and when possible to
place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger created by such sites." Id.
48. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902 (citing United States v. Reilly Tar and
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; see also Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1326
(Congress' intent was to empower federal courts to establish federal law of liability under CERCLA); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo.
1985) (federal interest in remedy of toxic waste sites and need for uniform law
justifies development of common law on the scope of generator liability).
52. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. The legislative history of CERCLA itself is inconclusive in determining the common law issue, and refers both to
"common law" and to "federal common law." Id. (citing 126 CONG. REC.
S14,964, H 11,787, H 11,799). However, in circumstances where there is a lack
of an express statutory provision declaring whether state or federal common law
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by the recognition that pervasive dumping of hazardous waste
was inadequately dealt with at the state level. 5 3 For that reason,
as well as the federal financial interest in the Superfund resources, the scope of liability under CERCLA is not dependent on
the laws of any state. 54 Accordingly, the rights, responsibilities
and liabilities under-section 107 are governed by a federal rule of
decision. 55 The courts may then properly develop a body of Federal specialized law in order to aid in the interpretation of the
56
unclear provisions of CERCLA.
In developing a body of federal common law, the starting
point should be federal statutes dealing with a similar subject
matter in order to determine the underlying federal policy. 5 7 In
is to be applied, "interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the
federal courts." Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808 (citing United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)). The federal courts have retained the power to fashion federal specialized common law when it is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interest." Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808 (citing
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); United
States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1947)).
53. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; see also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6142.
54. Chem-Dyne, 572.F. Supp. at 808-09 (citing United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (4973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
306 (1947); Clearfield Ti'ust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)).
55. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 593 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306
(1947); Clearfield Trust;Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)).
The Chem-Dyne cour'examined the question of whether CERCLA's scope of
liability should be interpreted by a federally created uniform law or according to
the incorporated state law of the forum state and maintained that CERCLA falls
into that category of Federal programs which must be uniform in character
throughout the country and which necessitate the formulation of federal rules of
decision. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728;
Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 311). As Representative Florio explained, "To insure
the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in
hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws,
the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this
area." Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. HI 1,787 (Dec.
3, 1980)).
Some courts, however, have interpreted CERCLA liability using state law
principles rather than federal law. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804
F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that state law should provide general content
of federal law on validity of releases of CERCLA § 107(e) contribution claims).
See generally Amy E. Aydelott, "CERCLAING" the Issues: Making Sense of Contractual
Liability Under CERCLA, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 358-61 (1992).

56. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. "[T]he delineation of a uniform federal
rule of decision is consistent with the legislative history and policies of CERCLA." Id.
57. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972)).
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making such a determination, however, neither the statutes or decisions of a particular state are conclusive when delineating fed58
eral law.
In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,59 a federal district court
confronted the issue of whether liability under section 107 could
be held joint and several. 60 While CERCLA itself does not expressly provide for joint and several liability, and Congress itself
considered and rejected such language, 6 ' the court determined
that CERCLA clearly provided for the development of federal
common law and held that under such a body of law, liability
62
could be joint and several.
In United States v. Wade, 63 the district court acknowledged the
federal interest in remedying toxic waste dangers. 64 The court
further discussed the need for uniform law as justification for
the development of federal common law regarding the scope
of generator liability under CERCLA. 65 The Wade court declared
that Congress intended for the courts to apply federal common
58. Id.
59. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
60. Id. at 804.
61. Both the original Senate and House bills expressly provided for joint,
several, and strict liability. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1486. The express provision in the Senate bill (S. 1480), however, was deleted in the compromise version which was finally presented and passed by the Senate on November 24,
1980. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess § 4a, 126 CONG. REC. 30,908 (1980). The
original House bill (H.R. 7020) was entirely discarded, and the bill finally passed
by the House on December 3, 1980 was the compromise Senate bill which had
already been passed in the Senate. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071, 126
CONG. REC.

26,779 (1980).

62. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. Accord ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1484.
The district court in ASARCO stated that "[iut is clear. . . that the deletion of all
references to joint and several liability from the Act did not signify that Congress rejected those standards of liability." Id. at 1486.
Several other courts have similarly reached the decision that liability under
§ 9607 could be joint and several. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1758-60 (D.S.C. Feb.
23, 1984); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 125557 (S.D. Ill. 1984); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1326.
63. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
64. Id. at 1336-37.
65. Id.
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67
law principles 66 in determining the scope of generator liability.
In rejecting the application of state law principles in questions of
joint and several liability, the court emphasized that common law
treatment of the issue varied from state to state, and that such
unequal application would "undermine the policy of the statute
by encouraging illegal dumping in states with lenient liability

laws."68

Despite the prevailing view that a uniform body of federal
common law concerning the scope of generator liability may be
legitimately formulated, courts have continued to struggle with
the scope of section 107(a)(3). Thus, the resulting decisions have
contributed little toward the goal of predictability in determining
under what circumstances parties may be liable as generators.
C.

Evolution of Generator Liability Under CERCLA
1.

Elements of Prima Facie Liability

Before response costs for the cleanup of a contaminated site
may be awarded, a prima facie case under CERCLA must be established. 6 9 The elements required to establish such prima facie
liability are: 1) the site is a "facility"; 70 2) there is a "release" or
66. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. The Wade court contended that a reading
of the entire legislative history of CERCLA reveals that the deletion of the express provision for joint and several liability was intended to "avoid mandatory
application of that standard to a situation where it would produce inequitable
results." Id. The court referred to the statement by Senator Randolph, who
introduced the amendment to delete the provision, specifically indicating that in
deleting the reference to joint and several liability, they were "relying on common law principles to determine when parties should be severally liable." Id.
(quoting 126 CONG. REC. S14,964 (Nov. 24, 1980)).
The chief sponsor of the House bill, Representative Florio, stated that:
[i]ssues of joint and several liability not resolved by this shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. The terms
joint and several have been deleted with the intent that the liability of
joint tortfeasors be determined under common or previous statutory
law.... To insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to
discourage business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this area.
Id. at 1337 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. HIl,787 (Dec. 3, 1980)).
67. Id. at 1338.
68. Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79
(8th Cir. 1989); see also Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Note, "Arrangingfor Disposal of
Hazardous Substances:" Expansive CERCLA Liability for Pesticide Manufacturers After
U.S. v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 35 S.D. L. REV. 251 (1990).
70. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCLA defines a "facility"
as:

(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
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"threatened release" of a "hazardous substance" from the site; 3)
the release or threatened release has caused the party seeking recovery to incur response costs; and 4) the defendants must fall
within one of the four categories of potentially responsible persons (PRPs). 7 t Under the fourth element, it remains difficult to
establish the precise circumstances under which a person is a "potentially responsible person" within the meaning of section
107(a).7 2 Arguably the greatest difficulty a party seeking recovery
for response costs may have in satisfying the fourth element is in
establishing that a person "arranged for disposal" within the
meaning of section 107(a)(3). 7 3 Courts have continued to find
themselves in a quandary due to the conflict created by the desire
to avoid frustrating the purpose of the Act by limiting the situations in which the fourth element may be established, and the unclear boundaries of the statutory standard.7 4 Thus, courts
continue to grapple with the permissible scope of generator
75
liability.
2. Judicial Development of Generator Liability
It has been necessary for courts to interpret the murky provisions of section 107(a)(3) and to develop a body of specialized
federal common law concerning the implementation of CERCLA's overall scheme. 76 The .development of such a body of law,
however, has done little to achieve the desired uniformity. 77 Most
troublesome in this evolution is the indistinct limit to the scope of
persons who may be held liable for arranger or generator
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id.
71. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378-79 (citing United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1985)); see also Ruckdaschel-Haley, supra note 69, at
251.
72. For a discussion of who may be a potentially responsible person under
CERCLA, see supra notes 15, 17, and accompanying text.
73. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20, at 34-36.
74. Gaba, supra note 38, at 1316.
75. Id.
76. For a discussion of the development of federal and state law in implementing CERCLA's provisions, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
77. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 20, at 42-47.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 6
VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV: p. 417

428

78

liability.
Liability under section 107(a)(3) has been clearly established
in the instance where a person creates hazardous wastes and arranges for its disposal at another facility. 79 The outer limits of
generator liability, however, appear to be in a state of transition."
The question remains concerning the minimum connections a
person may have within a contract or agreement in order to find
the person liable as a generator or arranger of toxic waste.8 '
Courts have generally concluded that sales of products containing toxic materials do not warrant the imposition of liability
2
on sellers under section 107(a)(3) as generators of toxic wastes.8
Given the magnitude of possible transactions between parties,
however, courts have been constrained to assess the transactions
on a case-by-case basis. This piecemeal evaluation has, for the
most part, led to further confusion and dubious progress toward
realizing uniformity or predictability.
3:

Scope of Persons Liable as "Generators"

In United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp. ,83 a federal
court of appeals held that a pesticide manufacturer who hired a
formulator to convert technical grade pesticides into commercial
grade pesticides was liable under section 107(a)(3) for arranging
for the disposal of hazardous wastes. 8 4 The court concluded that
the pesticide manufacturer "arranged for" the disposal of hazardous substances under section 107(a)(3) and denied its motion to
dismiss, based on three allegations in the formulator's complaint:
1) the pesticide manufacturer had contracted with him for the formulation of "their hazardous substances," 2) the pesticide manufacturer had retained ownership of the chemicals throughout the
process, and 3) the process inherently involved the generation
and disposal of hazardous wastes.8 5 The Aceto decision has been
considered by some commentators to be the most expansive ap78. Gaba, supra note 38, at 1313. "The scope of persons liable because they
'arranged for disposal' remains an uncertain and evolving issue." Id.
79. See id. "At a minimum, liability extends to generators who create a hazardous waste and arrange for its disposal at another facility." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 1384.
85. Id. The specific issue before the court was whether the district court
had properly dismissed the pesticide manufacturer's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1376.
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plication of generator liability.8 6
In reaching its conclusion, the Aceto court examined the
meanings behind the terms used in section 107(a)(3). 8 7 After examining the meaning of "disposal" as provided by the statute,8 8
the court discussed the possible interpretations of "arrange
for."8 9 Since the term is not defined in the statute, the court addressed the common meaning of the word. 90 The term "arrange"
is commonly defined in the English language as "to put in proper
order," "to adjust," "to settle," or "to prepare." 9 ' The pesticide
manufacturer argued that the common meaning of "arrange" required that it could only be held liable under section 107(a)(3) if
it intended to dispose of a waste, 9 2 and that since the complaint
alleged only an intent to arrange for formulation of a product, no
intent to dispose of waste could be inferred. 93 The court, however,
94
rejected this formulation of the term.
The Aceto court examined the broad remedial purpose of
CERCLA, as well as the statute's legislative history, 95 and con86. See Ruckdaschel-Haley, supra note 69, at 251 (citing Todd M. Thornhill,
The Aceto Case: Suppliers of Hazardous Substances Being Held to Their Common-Law
Duties, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1148 (Nov. 3, 1989); Theodore L. Garrett, The
Aceto Case: CERCLA Liabilityfor Products? 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 16 at 704
(Aug. 18, 1989)).
87. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379.
88. Id. For a discussion of the meaning of "disposal" under CERCLA, see
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
89. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380.
90. Id. The court examined the pesticide manufacturer's dictionary definition of "arrange." Id. The court noted that "[diefendants contend the word
'arrange' means 'to come to an agreement' or 'to make plans, prepare.' " Id. at
1380 n.7 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 120 (1961)).
91. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-

99 (Unabridged ed. 1964).
92. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court examined the pertinent legislative history, and noted that
the original Senate and House bills contained more explicit language. Id.
H.R. 7020, the original House bill, contained language extending liability to
-any person who caused or contributed to" a release or threatened release of
toxic substances. Id. at 1380 n.8 (citing H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980));
see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally Grad, supra note 6.
Similarly, the Senate bill, S. 1480, as originally introduced, stated that liability would attach to "any person who caused or contributed to a release of hazardous substances." Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380 n.8 (citing S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980)). This language was changed by the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works to the statement, "any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for" and incorporated into the final Act. Id. (citing
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENVTL. AND
PUB. WORKS, WORKING PAPER No. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
GUAGE
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cluded that any interpretation of "arrange for" that would permit
the pesticide manufacturers to "close their eyes" to the method of
toxic substance disposal was contrary to CERCLA's policies. 9 6
Several courts have imposed the requirement of a nexus between a party to be held liable under section 107(a)(1) and the
disposal in order to find that the party had "arranged for disposal."'9 7 However, in CPC International,Inc. v. Aerojet-GeneralCorp.,98
a district court in Michigan held that the determining factor for
finding such a nexus was whether the party had assumed responsibility for determining the fate of the hazardous substances. 99
This court reasoned that the assumption of responsibility was
more determinative of liability than looking to the creation of the
substances, title to them, or active involvement in their
disposal.' 0 0
Ownership of the hazardous chemicals is a factor that has
been weighed differently by various courts. For some courts,
ownership of the hazardous chemicals is a heavily weighed factor
in imposing section 107(a)(3) liability, and often tips the scales in
favor of liability. 0 1 The Aceto court specifically distinguished the
facts before it from a case where liability was not imposed, on the
basis that the hazardous substances were no longer owned by the
0 2
defendants.
The reasons for the change to "arrange for" are "not easy to divine," however, "elimination of the concept of 'cause' is consistent with the imposition of
strict liability." Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380 n.8; see also Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at
1039-40; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
96. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380-82.
97. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (some nexus must exist between potentially responsible party and
disposal of hazardous substance); see also NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743. Accord B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (nexus required for generator liability); General Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 967 F.2d 587
(2d Cir. 1992) (nexus required to impose liability not found in lease arrangement between oil companies and service station tenants to impose liability on oil
companies for tenants' waste). Compare Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1326 (rejecting
argument that there must be causal nexus between cleanup costs and specific
generator's waste as eviscerating CERCLA's remedial intent).
98. 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
99. Id. at 1278 ("[Generator liability] requires the assumption of responsibility for or control over the disposition of hazardous waste.").
100. Id. ("The nexus issue is not a test of whether a party created or left
hazardous substances or had title to them, but rather whether the party assumed
responsibility for determining their fate.").
101. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383-84.
102. Id. at 1384. In imposing liability the court distinguished its findings
from the holding in United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983), in that "defendants in [Aceto] did not sell their
technical grade pesticide to [the formulator]; they retained ownership through-
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On the other hand, where ownership is not demonstrated,
retention of control is a factor strongly considered by other
courts.' 0 3 In United States v. NortheasternPharmaceuticaland Chemical
Co., 104 the Eighth Circuit held that despite the defendant's lack of
ownership of the hazardous substances, generator liability was
properly imposed due to the defendant's authority to control the
handling and disposal of the waste.' 0 5 Similarly, a district court in
United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc. 106 stated that the crucial
inquiry for establishing generator liability is in determining "who
decided" the location and method of treatment or disposal of the
toxic substance.1 0 7 In following this guideline, the court proceeded to impose generator liability on a party who sold a caustic
solution to another defendant, after finding that disposal of the
08
solution was the motivation for the sale.'
4.

Characterizationof the Arrangement: Sale or Incorporation

Defendants in an action for recovery for response costs have
at times argued successfully that the particular circumstances of
their arrangement amounted to a true "sale" of the hazardous
substances in order to avoid generator liability.' 0 9 Some courts,
however, have imposed generator liability in order to prevent the
circumvention of section 107(a)(3) by merely characterizing the
out the formulation process. Moreover, [the formulator] was not manufacturing
a product for its own use; it was formulating defendants' pesticide products for
them." Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384 (citing Westinghouse, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1233).
103. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743-44.
104. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 743-44. The court stated its belief that "requiring proof of personal ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a precondition for liability under CERCLA [§ 107(a)(3)] would be inconsistent with
the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA." Id. at 743; see also Mottolo, 629 F.
Supp. at 56 (person who arranges for disposal or transportation not required to
own or possess hazardous waste).
106. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
107. Id.; see also Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.
Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.), affd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
108. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. at 845 (section
107(a)(3) liability not endless and ends with party who both owned hazardous
substance and made decision how as to disposal or treatment). Accord Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 240.
109. Westinghouse, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1233 (defendant who sold
hazardous substance to another for use in manufacturing process and not disposal, not liable even where contaminant is found in waste from manufacturing
process); see also Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384. Compare United States v. Ward, 618 F.
Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
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arrangements as a "sale." ' " 0

Incorporation of a "useful" product is another characterization which has proven to have varying results for precluding liability for some defendants. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis
Chalmers Corp.,"' the Eleventh Circuit refrained from imposing
liability on one party who sold a "useful" product to another
party, who in turn incorporated the substance into another product which was ultimately discarded." t2 In Florida Power & Light,
the manufacturers of PCB-contaminated transformers sold transformers to a company which utilized them for several years before
selling them to a salvage company which released the contaminants into the environment during their reclamation process.' 1
The manufacturer was not held liable for "arranging for disposal" of the hazardous wastes based on the evidence.' 14 In explicitly refusing to apply a per se rule in determining the liability of a
manufacturer under CERCLA, however, the court stated that
"even though a manufacturer does not make the critical decisions
as to how, when, and by whom a hazardous substance is to be
disposed, the manufacturer may be liable."' '5 To impose generator liability on the manufacturer, evidence must indicate that the
manufacturer is the party "otherwise arranging" the disposal of
the toxic substance."16
The use of characterization, however, has done little to further delineate the standards for imposing liability. In determining liability, the Aceto court maintained that "courts have not
hesitated to look beyond defendant's characterizations to determine whether a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for
disposal of a hazardous substance.'17
5.

Intent to Dispose or Knowledge of Disposal

Most courts considering the issue have held that intent is not

8
a requirement for imposing generator liability under CERCLA."1

110. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. at 842. Accord New York v. General
Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[It is ...clear that a waste
generator's liability under CERCLA is not to be so facilely circumvented by its
characterization of its arrangements as 'sales.' ").
111. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
112. Id. at 1318.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1315.
115. Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1318.

116. Id.
117. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381.
118. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); see Aceto,
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The majority of courts have rejected the argument that lack of
intent to dispose precludes generator liability, and have maintained that liability under CERCLA is strict, without regard to the
party's fault, state of mind, or intent." 9 Liability has been imposed even in circumstances where a party was unaware that hazardous substances would be deposited at a particular site, and
20
believed they would be deposited elsewhere.
Furthermore, court decisions have imposed liability on a
party where the generation of toxic wastes is inherent in the
process of formulation.' 2 ' In Aceto, the court determined that the
inherent knowledge of the party owning the technical grade pesticide that hazardous wastes would be generated in the process, despite having hired a formulator to actually make the commercial
grade pesticide, was an important factor in imposing section
10 7 (a)(3) liability on the technical grade pesticide owner.' 2 2 In
addition, some courts have held that summary judgment will be
23
precluded by allegations of such inherent knowledge.'
Despite the avowed need for a uniform body of federal law in
implementing the remedial purposes of CERCLA, it is evident
that several factors are used by courts in determining when generator liability exists. Due to the wide range of specific relationships and agreements between parties, the determination can
often be made only after an evaluation of the factors present in a
particular case. Furthermore, through the use of characterization, and the relative weights given by courts to different factors
in assessing liability, uniformity and predictability continue to be
24
elusive goals.'
872 F.2d at 1380-81; see also Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 897; Missouri v. Independent
Petrochemical Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at
1336.
119. See Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1304. For a discussion of strict liability under
CERCLA, see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
120. Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 897.
121. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378, 1384.
122. Id. at 1378.
123. United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tenn.
1987). In Velsicol, summary judgment was held to have been properly denied
due to the government's allegations that a pesticide chemicals supplier had
knowledge of industry-wide pesticide formulation practices and that hazardous
waste generation was an incident of the formulation process. Id. at 142-43.
124. Where the action is one for contribution among parties for recovery
costs, some courts have begun to express the relative weights given to various
standards for imposing liability as utilizing equitable factors in determining the
level of contribution to be allocated among the parties. See United States v. Shaner, Civ. No. 85-1372, 1990 WL 115085 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1990). See generally
Amoco Oil v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989) (action involving one
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III. JONES-HAMILTON Co. v. BEAZER MATERIALS & SERVICES, INC.

In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc., 12 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an action
for contribution for cleanup costs, confronted the issue of
whether CERCLA imposed "generaitor" or "arranger" liability on
Beazer for generating toxic wastes within the meaning of section
107(a)(3).1 2 6 The court held that Beazer was liable for generating
2 7
hazardous wastes as an "arranger."'
Jones-Hamilton (J-H), was a contracting chemical formulator
which formulated raw materials provided by Beazer into wood
preservation compounds. 12 8 Beazer retained ownership of the
materials it provided under the agreement, 29 including substances classified as "hazardous substances" under CERCLA.' 30
The agreement provided for a "tolerance" of two percent
party suing another for recovery of cleanup costs under CERCLA is contribution
action). A full discussion of contribution under CERCLA is beyond the scope of
this Note; the issue being addressed here is a possible explanation of the wide
range of criteria used in imposing generator liability.
Considering possibly the most recent step on the evolutionary ladder of
CERCLA liability, the court in Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc.,
969 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1992), discussed judicial flexibility in determining the
factors to be used in assessing the allocation of cleanup costs among multiple
responsible parties. The Ensco court maintained that courts may legitimately examine the equities, and in any given case may consider several factors, a few
factors, or only one factor in assessing liability depending on the totality of circumstances presented to the court. Id.This approach may not facilitate the development of a uniform body of law, however, it may more accurately portray
the methods courts must utilize in order to deal with the breadth of circumstances under which generator liability may be established.
125. 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1992 WL 201121 (9th Cir. 1992).
Upon denial of rehearing, the decision appearing at 959 F.2d 126 was amended
and superseded; however, the amendments discuss the issue of the appealability
of summary judgment motions, and do not affect the substantive issues of generator liability and indemnity.
126. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131-32.
127. Id.at 131. The court additionally held that while the clause for indemnification of Beazer did not violate public policy, it nonetheless did not protect
Beazer from costs arising from its own wrongful acts. Id. at 130.
A full discussion of the issue of indemnification under CERCLA is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, indemnification will be discussed as to its impact on the court's decision to hold "generator liability" against Beazer.
128. Id. at 128. The original agreement was entered into by Jones-Hamilton and the Wood Treating Chemical Co. (WTCC) in 1970. Id. at 127. WTCC
was then purchased by Kop-Coat, Inc., and Beazer subsequently assumed the
duties, liabilities and rights of Kop-Coat. Id. The agreement between JonesHamilton and WTCC was to continue until terminated by written notice, which
occurred in 1984. Id.
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. The raw materials provided by Beazer included pentachlorophenol
and tetrachlorophenol, both of which are classified under CERCLA as "hazardous substances." Id.; see CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 2601(14). For a dis-
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shrinkage per month in the materials Beazer provided.'3' Addi32
tionally, the agreement provided for indemnification of Beazer'
for any costs incurred due toJ-H's failure to comply with all appli33
cable laws. 1
J-H performed its formulation activities with a consultant employed by Beazer on site during the formulation process. 34 During the formulation process, substances prohibited from
discharge 35 were released into J-H's waste water containment
ponds. Is 6 After the contamination was discovered, cleanup and
abatement orders were issued 3 7 to J-H resulting in substantial
3 8
compliance costs.'
39
J-H brought a contribution action for cleanup costs'
against Beazer and sought a declaratory judgment regarding
Beazer's "potential liability" under CERCLA. t40 Beazer's
counter-claim sought indemnity under the formulation agreecussion of the meaning of "hazardous substance" under CERCLA, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
131. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128 ("A tolerance of up to two percent by volume
shall be allowed for spillage or shrinkage in any calendar month ....").
132. Id. The agreement originally provided for indemnification of WTCC.
For the discussion of J-H's agreement to indemnify WTCC, see infra note 135
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Beazer's assumption of the rights
and liabilities of the original contract, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128 ("J-H agrees to comply with all applicable Federal, State and Local laws, ordinances, codes, rules and regulations and to indemnify WTCC against all losses, damages and costs resulting from any failure
of J-H or any of its employees, agents or contractors to do so.").
134. Id. The full extent of the role of Beazer's consultant, Dr. Stutz, in the
formulation process while on site atJ-H's Newark, California facility, is disputed.
Id. The district court noted, however, that "[a]lthough the agent's full role in
the formulation process is disputed, it is clear that his duties included, at a minimum, insuring that plaintiff maintained quality control standards that were acceptable to defendants." Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp.
1022, 1023 (N.D. Ca. 1990), aff'd in part, reversed in part, Jones-Hamilton Co. v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992).
135. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128. Despite the prohibition underJ-H's permit,
prohibited substances, "apparently including pentachlorophenol, were nonetheless discharged into the ponds." Id. For a discussion ofJ-H's permit limitations
and the raw materials provided by Beazer, see supra note 130 & infra note 136
and accompanying text.
136. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128. J-H's permit received in 1970 from the California Regional Water Quality Control Board prohibited the discharge of chemicals other than certain listed substances into its waste water containment ponds.
Id.
137. Id. The cleanup and abatement orders were issued by the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board. Id.
138. Id. ("J-H has spent over $2,000,000 to comply with the orders.").
139. Id.; see CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
140. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128.
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ment. 14 1 Each party subsequently moved for summary judgment. 14 2 The district court 145 denied J-H's motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether Beazer had "arranged
1 44
for the disposal" of toxic wastes.
J-H appealed 1 45 the denial of partial summary judgment on
generator liability. 1 46 The issue before the Ninth Circuit was
whetherJ-H's summary judgment motion was properly granted as
to Beazer's liability under section 107(a)(3). 14 7 The court of appeals held that the district court erred in denyingJ-H's motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of Beazer's generator liability, and reversed the lower court's decision. 48 The court man141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc. 750 F. Supp. 1022
(N.D. Cal. 1990)).
144. Id. Beazer's summary judgment motion as toJ-H's duty to indemnify
Beazer was granted, and the court held that the indemnification clause barred JH's claim for contribution. Id. The district court additionally awarded attorney's fees to Beazer as an indemnitor prosecuting its indemnity claim. Id. at
132.
145. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the standard of review for denial of a motion for summary judgment. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 130. The court
noted that denial of summary judgment is generally not appealable since it is not
a final order. Id. (citing Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1482 n.20 (9th Cir.
1988), afd, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)). However, in this instance the district court's
grant of summary judgment "was a final decision giving [the court] jurisdiction
to review its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment." Beazer, 959
F.2d at 130 (citing Abend, 863 F.2d at 1482 n.20).
146. Id. at 127.
147. Id. The court of appeals also confronted the issue of whether the indemnification clause was against public policy under CERCLA in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 129-30. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) states that:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance
shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or
facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of
release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed
under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement
to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for
any liability under this section.
Id.
As the Ninth Circuit noted, "courts around the country have reached different interpretations of this language." Beazer, 959 F.2d at 129. The Ninth Circuit
previously held that enforcement of an indemnification clause does not violate
public policy under CERCLA. Id. (citing Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,
804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986)).
148. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131. In addition, the court held that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Beazer on the issue of
indemnification. Id. at 130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
The court further vacated the lower court's decision to award attorney's fees
to Beazer, and held that the lower court could revisit the issue of awarding attorneys fees to an indemnitor after determining to what extent each party was liable
for cleanup costs. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 132.
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dated that the district court grant summary judgment in favor of
J-H and hold that Beazer "arranged for disposal" of the hazardous substances.1 4 9 After stating that Beazer was liable for the
generating of wastes, the court remanded the action for a determination of the extent of Beazer's liability for contribution for
cleanup costs, both for its "arranger" liability and any direct par50
ticipation in waste disposal at J-H's facility.'
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Beazer court held that Beazer was liable under the formulation agreement for generating hazardous waste within the
meaning of section 107(a)(3), and that J-H was entitled to contribution to the extent of that liability.' 5 ' However, as material issues of fact remained regarding Beazer's involvement in the
disposal of the wastes, the appellate court ruled that summary
judgement was precluded on the issue of Beazer's generator liability, and that the the motion for partial summary judgment was
15 2
properly denied by the district court.
The issue of the scope of generator liability was one of first
impression in the Ninth Circuit.153 However, in reaching its decision, the Beazer court avoided an examination of the legislative
history of CERCLA.' 5 4 The court's statutory analysis entailed citing the language of section 107(a)(3) and noting that "arranged
for" was not defined.' 5 5 The court cited the decisions of other
jurisdictions which followed varied approaches. 156 The court
149. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 132 ("The district court should grant summary

judgment in favor ofJ-H, holding that Beazer 'arranged for disposal' of hazardous materials.").
150. Id. at 131-32. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that J-H was obligated to indemnify Beazer for any liability Beazer incurred as a
result of J-H's wrongdoing, and contribution from Beazer could not be sought
to the extent of J-H's infraction. Id. at 132.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 131 ("We have not yet addressed the issue of when liability for

'arranging for disposal' will attach.").
154. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131. The Ninth Circuit briefly examined the legislative history of CERCLA in it decision in Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1454, concerning

the issue of indemnification; that process, however, was far from the in-depth
examination which has been performed by other courts in interpreting CERCLA

provisions.
155. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131. The court further quoted the definition of
"disposal." Id.; see CERCLA § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). For an explana-

tion of the meaning of disposal, see supra notes 39, 41, and accompanying text.
156. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General
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compared and contrasted the Beazer facts to the facts of Aceto and
Florida Power & Light. 15 7 The Beazer court based its decision primarily on analogy to the facts and on the holding in Aceto, and
attempted to distinguish the case from Florida Power & Light. 158
The Beazer court discussed the factual circumstances of Aceto,
and reasoned that since the issue was one of first impression in its
jurisdiction, 59 and the facts presented to the court were similar
to those in Aceto, the Ninth Circuit would apply the Aceto court's
holding.' 60 In following the Aceto holding, however, the Beazer
court did not endeavor to determine if the reasoning behind the
Aceto decision was sound, but merely applied its holding after
viewing the facts. 16 In consideration of the fact that the Aceto decision has been considered by many to be the most expansive application of generator liability,' 6 2 the Beazer court should have
more closely scrutinized the Aceto court's reasoning. Furthermore, the Beazer court acknowledged the lack of definition of the
term "arrange," but did not apply the rule of statutory construc63
tion that requires an exploration of the legislative history.
In Beazer, the court observed the fact that in Aceto the pesticide company which hired the formulator had retained ownership
of the chemicals it provided.1'4 The Beazer court then found a
similar element of ownership in the contract before it.165 Similarly, the Aceto court was heavily influenced by the retention of
ownership of the hazardous substances,1 66 and rejected the argument that although the defendants retained ownership, liability
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754
F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991); United States v. Shaner, Civ. No. 85-1372, 1990
WL 115085 (E.D. Pa.June 25, 1990); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701
F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)).
157. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131. For a discussion of the facts and holding in
Aceto, see supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the holding in Florida Power & Light, see supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
158. See Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131 n.2. For a discussion of the facts of Beazer as
contrasted to those in FloridaPower & Light, see infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
159. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See generally Ruckdaschel-Haley, supra note 69, at 251.
163. Beazer 959 F.2d at 131. For a discussion of basic rules of statutory
construction, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
164. Id. (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)). For a discussion of
the effect of retention of ownership on generator liability, see supra notes 101-02
and accompanying text.
165. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 128.
166. Acelo, 872 F.2d at 1373.
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should not be imposed as they had no authority to control the
67
materials or the decision as to the manner of their disposal.
Other courts have indicated their preference for the authority to control as having greater weight than the retention of ownership. 68 While in both Beazer and Aceto the retention of
ownership was a deciding factor, it is clear that generator liability
has been imposed in numerous situations where there was no
such provision in the agreement. The Beazer court, however,
failed to discuss why it did not find such reasoning persuasive and
why it preferred ownership to be the controlling factor.
The Beazer court distinguished the facts of Florida Power &
Light on the grounds that the defendants in that case had
purchased a product which had contained toxic materials, and
had used the product for forty years before "disposing" of it.169
The Beazer court remarked that while the Florida Power & Light
court declined to impose generator liability in that instance, it had
also declared that it was not fashioning a per se rule.170 However,
the Beazer court again failed to state how the Florida Power & Light
court's reasoning impacted on the facts before it, notably since
7
retention of ownership was not a factor in that case.1 '
The Beazer court only briefly discussed the spillage clause in
the agreement between J-H and Beazer.17 2 The court designed
the following syllogistic argument for imposing generator liability
on Beazer: 1) Beazer retained ownership of the chemicals it provided; 2) the materials it provided included substances classified
as hazardous under CERCLA; and 3) the agreement contemplated a level of spillage. 17 3 The court then declared it was
"clear" that Beazer had arranged for disposal under section
1
107(a)(3). 74

However, the Beazer court did not scrutinize the meaning of
the provision which tolerated a small percent of spillage of the
materials owned by Beazer nor the intent of the parties in fashioning the provision retaining Beazer's ownership of the materi167. Id.
168. For a discussion of the effect of the authority to control on liability, see
supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
169. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131 n.2.
170. Id. (citing Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1318)).
171. See Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
172. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131.
173. Id.
174. Id. ("Thus, it is clear that under the agreement Beazer 'arranged for
disposal' of toxic substances within the meaning of section 9607.") (footnote
omitted).
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als.' 7 5 The court noted the Aceto court's rejection of the intent
argument as a basis for withholding liability,' 76 but then proceeded to infer that Beazer was liable for "arranging of disposal"
of the toxic substances under section 107(a)(3) on the basis that
Beazer had "contemplated" spillage due to the tolerance provision, despite J-H's agreement to comply with all applicable
laws.1 7 7 The court, in effect, surmised that the intent to arrange
for disposal could be inferred from the agreement for imposing
liability for noncompliance with the law.
Furthermore, in following the Aceto holding, the Beazer court
referred to the Aceto court's assertion that it would go beyond the
parties' characterizations of a transaction in determining whether
generator liability is met. 178 For this reason, the limits of the
scope of generator liability to be imposed in the Ninth Circuit
remain unclear. The weight of retention of ownership as a controlling factor, and whether it is a required element in the Ninth
Circuit, remains uncertain. In adopting such an expansive standard, the Beazer court should have made at least a minimal attempt to discern Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA, delineate
the circumstances under which generator liability may be imposed, and set forth its own reasoning for its findings.
V.

IMPACT

The Beazer decision has done little to define the standard: of
generator liability in the Ninth Circuit, and may indicate a trend
in courts' unwillingness to engage in the arduous process of discerning the meaning of CERCLA's provisions. At first glance the
decision may appear to facilitate the process of achieving greater
uniformity as one jurisdiction follows the decision of another.
However, in merely following an expansive standard of looking
beyond the parties' characterizations, without delineating the requirements of the standard beyond the factor of ownership, the
Beazer decision lends little toward predictability in the scope of
generator liability. Uniformity, even limited uniformity, will not
result from a jurisdiction's wholesale adoption of an expansiye
standard in imposing liability without further delineation.
175. Id.
176. Id. For a discussion of the Aceto court's reasoning that intent is not
required for imposing generator liability, see supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
177. Beazer, 959 F.2d at 131.
178. Id. (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380).
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The outer limits of liability under section 107(a)(3) are not
yet in sight. The goal of developing a more uniform body of federal common law to be utilized in interpreting CERCLA's more
obscure provisions while implementing its overall policies has not
been met. It is evident that the last of the possible variations on
circumstances and agreements between parties, as well as the emphasis each court places on various factors to determine liability,
is not yet within reach. This state of flux makes it difficult for
parties to have any reasonable reassurance that agreements they
become involved in concerning the use of hazardous materials
will afford them any protection from generator liability. The
sweep of what may fairly be considered "arranging for disposal"
is perhaps overly broad and affords parties few guidelines in
avoiding, or even limiting, liability.
The uncertainty created by section 107(a)(3) as it was
adopted is likely an inherent result of the manner in which CERCLA was enacted. However, given the broad remedial nature of
CERCLA, and the strong interest in avoiding the frustration of
any of its policies, the courts have been left to resolve the details
of the application of generator liability in a piecemeal manner.
The Beazer decision demonstrates the need for Congress to
amend the language of section 107 (a) (3) to more clearly delineate
the ultimate scope of generator liability. The application of the
Aceto holding, without careful reasoning or adherence to general
rules of statutory construction, indicates the Beazer court's strong
unwillingness to discern Congressional intent or to wrestle with
the scope of generator liability. The breadth of interactions
which could result in liability if this trend continues, suggests that
the best solution is for Congress to amend section 107(a) in order
to alleviate the inherent ambiguities in the determination of generator liability.
Meigan Flood Cooper
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